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Recent insider trading cases reveal a stark conceptual divide between the federal 
courts and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regarding 
liability for securities fraud in cases in which an insider (a “tipper”) gives 
material non-public information to a market professional or close friend or other 
potential trader (a “tippee”). Following the landmark Supreme Court case 
called Dirks v. SEC, the federal courts do not impose liability on tippers or 
tippees unless there the tipper receives a consequential personal benefit or is a 
close friend or relative of the tippee. The SEC abjures this "personal benefit" 
requirement, and would define the concept of personal benefit so broadly as to 
remove it as an impediment to insider trading prosecutions.  
 
This Article explains the economic function of the personal benefit test as 
establishing the criterion upon which legitimate trading on the basis of material 
non-public information can be distinguished from venal or corrupt trading. The 
Article shows that the personal benefit test, while a valuable innovation to 
insider trading jurisprudence, is severely limited because it does not capture all 
of the various motivations that cause insiders to convey material non-public 
information to traders. This Article fills that gap by providing a complete 
taxonomy of tipping and trading, and explaining the legal consequences of all of 
the various forms of insider trading. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a lot of confusion about the permissibility of insider trading1 
because regulators lack a complete understanding of the legitimate, non-
corrupt reasons that insiders regularly reveal material non-public information 
to Wall Street market professionals such as traders at hedge funds and invest-
ment banks. This incomplete understanding of why people tip is accompanied 
by a concomitant lack of understanding about the role that tipping plays in 
stock markets and reveals a core disagreement between the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the federal courts about whether the law 
should prohibit all or only certain forms of trading by those with an acute 
informational advantage over their counter-parties. 
																																								 																				
1 In this Article, I use the term “insider trading” to mean the trading on the basis of an inform-
ational advantage (an informational asymmetry between purchasers and sellers) that occurs 
when one party trades on the basis of material non-public information that is neither reflected 
in the market price of the security being traded, nor available to the insider’s counter-party prior 
to the trade.  Of course insiders such as corporate officers or lawyers and investment bankers 
who have regular access to material non-public information sometimes trade only after such 
information is disclosed.  Such trading is not controversial and this Article does not consider 
such trading. 
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Specifically, the confused state of the law results from the fact that we 
lack a complete account of the economic effects of tipping. The existing test 
for determining liability in tipping cases, the personal benefit test invented by 
Justice Powell in Dirks v. SEC,2 is a brilliant innovation.3 The point of the test 
is to distinguish when trading on the basis of tips from insiders is beneficial 
and should be permitted, versus when such trading is harmful to markets and 
should be banned.   
But like many prototypes, it is somewhat crude. The Dirks test is crude 
because it divides tippers into two stark categories: those who receive a 
personal benefit in exchange for their tip and those who do not.4 Those who 
receive a benefit when they tip have broken the law, while those who receive 
no benefit have not. The goal of this Article is to offer a more nuanced approach 
to tipping that better tracks the various reasons why tipping actually occurs in 
trading markets and more accurately sorts permissible from impermissible 
insider trading. 
This Article begins by briefly recounting the fundamental disagreement 
between the SEC and the courts about the role that insider trading law plays in 
capital markets. The SEC takes the view that the purpose of the law is to 
alleviate asymmetries in information between trading parties in order to 
promote “fairness,” which the SEC equates with parity of information among 
traders.5 The Supreme Court has explicitly and repeatedly rejected the SEC’s 
fairness approach to insider trading law. The Court’s interpretation of Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19346—the anti-fraud provision of the 
Exchange Act—is not designed to promote fairness among strangers who trade 
																																								 																				
2 463 U.S. 646 (1983).  
3 See generally Jonathan R. Macey, The Genius of the Personal Benefit Test, 69 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 64 (2016) (arguing that the personal benefit test, and insider trading law more generally, 
is clear and sensible, and that any arguments to the contrary stem from inconsistencies among the 
executive branch and the judiciary—not between the federal courts themselves).  
4 See Dirks v. SEC, 462 U.S. 646, 663 (“To determine whether a disclosure itself deceives, 
manipulates, or defrauds shareholders, the initial inquiry is whether there has been a breach of 
duty by the insider. This requires courts to focus on . . . whether the insider receives a direct or 
indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit 
that will translate into future earnings.” (citation and quotations omitted)). 
5 See e.g. Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules 
Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 35 & n.133 (1984) (finding that the SEC in 
Dirks harkened back to a “bygone fairness era”) 
6 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp 
(2006)). The SEC adopted Rule 10b-5, pursuant to the authority delegated to it in §10(b).  17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980); see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997) 
(“Pursuant to its § 10(b) rulemaking authority, the Commission has adopted Rule 10b–5”).  
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in anonymous markets. Rather, it is designed to police trading by insiders, as 
well as the interactions of insiders and Wall Street traders, and to regulate the 
improper use of proprietary corporate information.7 
Because the SEC views any sort of trading on the basis of an informa-
tional advantage as unfair, it would ban all such trading. For the SEC, the 
motivation of a tipper is irrelevant because all tipping is bad given that it enables 
trading on the basis of an informational advantage over one’s counter-party.8 In 
sharp contrast, the Court’s view is that only tipping that reflects a breach of a 
tipper’s pre-existing duties of trust and confidence is problematic.9   
The difference between the SEC’s approach and that of the Supreme 
Court could not be more profound. Because the SEC views trading on the basis 
of any sort of informational advantage as wrongful, the Commission regards all 
trading on the basis of tipping by an insider as wrongful and deleterious to the 
functioning of capital markets.10 In stark contrast, while the Court condemns 
trading on the basis of tips in certain contexts, it views such insider trading as 
highly salutary to the proper functioning of capital markets in other contexts.11   
Because the Court’s personal benefit test12 is designed to sort useful 
(efficient) insider trading from harmful (inefficient) insider trading, the test has 
no value to the SEC, because the SEC denies the underlying distinction on 
which the personal benefit test is based. From the SEC’s perspective, no sorting 
is required—and hence no sorting test is needed—because all trading by 
																																								 																				
7 Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Regulation and Scholarship: Constant Companions 
or Occasional Bedfellows?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 106 (2009).  
8 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 651 (“The SEC concluded: Where tipees - regardless of 
their motivation or occupation - come into possession of material corporate information that 
they know is confidential and know or should know came from a corporate insider, they must 
either publicly disclose that information or refrain from training” (emphasis added) (citation 
and internal quotations omitted)). 
9 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-55 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 455 U.S. 222, 
232 (“[T]here can be no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside 
information ‘was not [the corporation’s] agent, . . . was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person 
in whom the sellers [of the securities] had placed their trust and confidence.’”). 
10 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 (“The SEC's position . . . is that a tippee 'inherits' the  
. . . obligation to shareholders whenever he receives inside information from an insider” .) 
11 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 242-43 (providing a list of examples and 
concluding that, "[i]n each of these instances, trading is accomplished on the basis of 
material, nonpublic information, but the information has not been unlawfully converted for 
personal gain."); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646, (“Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely 
because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and 
trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC 
itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.”).  
12 See supra note 4.  
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insiders on the basis of tips is harmful because all such trading is based on an 
informational advantage that the SEC views as fundamentally unfair. Thus it 
is not surprising that the SEC dislikes the personal benefit test and has tried for 
decades to undermine it in every way that it can.13 
After an Introduction and describing the role played by the personal 
benefit test in Part II,14 the third Part of the Article articulates a taxonomy of 
tipping that indicates the different contexts in which tipping by insiders occurs, 
and describes the social welfare gains and losses associated with insider trading 
on the basis of tips of material non-public information in each of these 
contexts.15 Part IV synthesizes the analysis in Part III by contrasting how 
tipping and trading is viewed from a legal perspective by the SEC, and the 
federal courts.16 Part IV also shows how the law of insider trading would 
change if the efficiency-oriented analysis proposed in this Article were to be 
implemented. A conclusion follows.17 
The goal of this Article is to show that the personal benefit test requires 
tweaking and to suggest appropriate revisions. As it stands, the personal benefit 
test is simultaneously under and over inclusive, legalizing some trading that 
																																								 																				
13 Macey, supra note 3, at 65-66 (noting the various ways in which the SEC has attempted 
to regulate the trading of information). For example, in a direct response to Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the SEC promulgated Rule 14(e)(3), which eliminates 
the Supreme Court’s requirement of a personal benefit in insider trading cases involving 
tender offers on the basis of special SEC authority to regulate tender offers. 17 C.F.R. 
240.14e-3 (1981). Likewise, the SEC promulgated Regulation FD, which purports to 
eliminate the very selective disclosure that the Supreme Court approved in Dirks. 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 243.100-243.103 (2011).  Regulation FD prohibits U.S. public companies from making 
selective, non-public disclosures to analysts.  Id.  A concern with the rule is that it might lead 
to fewer disclosures and lower quality of analyst forecasts, and thus diminish the quality and 
efficiency of the capital markets. See Armando Gomes, Gary Gorton and Leonardo 
Madureira, SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure, Information and the Cost of Capital, 13 J. 
CORP. FIN. 300, 300 (2007)  (demonstrating that Regulation FD caused a significant shift in 
analyst attention away from small firms). The SEC also adopted litigation stances in 
Chiarella and Dirks that rejected the Supreme Court’s long-held view that tipping should be 
decriminalized in certain contexts.  Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 (declining to apply “such a 
new and different theory of liability” that the appellate court had invoked to affirm  
the conviction and rejecting the SEC’s alternative theory in support of liability “that 
petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when he acted upon information that 
he obtained by virtue of his position as an employee of a printer employed by the 
corporation”); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656 (asserting that the SEC’s litigation position in the case 
“differs little from the view that [the Supreme Court] rejected as inconsistent with 
congressional intent in Chiarella”). 
14 See Part II, infra at 42-54. 
15 See Part III, infra at 54-78. 
16 See Part IV, infra at 79-81. 
17 See Part V, infra at 81-83. 
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should be banned and penalizing other trading that should be rewarded. The 
test is under-inclusive in that some people who provide tips to insiders should 
be prohibited from doing so even if they do not receive a personal benefit for 
their tips. The test is over-inclusive because certain trading can be socially 
beneficial in spite of the fact that the insider providing the tip has received a 
personal benefit from a trader in exchange for the tip.    
A more complete taxonomy of the nature of tipping is important for 
normative reasons. On the one hand, if there were no venal reasons for tipping, 
then it would make sense to permit all tipping. But it is trivially easy to show 
that there are plenty of venal reasons for tipping. On the other hand, it would 
also be an oversimplification to label all tipping as stemming from venality, and 
ban tipping in its entirety. Creating a more complete taxonomy, however, does 
not completely solve the analytical problem. Having created that taxonomy, one 
must then examine the various contexts in which tipping occurs and determine 
the contexts in which it should be banned, the contexts in which it should be 
grudgingly tolerated, and the contexts in which it should be encouraged. 
If there were no salutary reasons for insiders to provide tips of material, 
non-public information, then it would make sense to ban all such tipping. 
Because it turns out that, as a descriptive matter, tipping by insiders that then 
leads to trading can sometimes be benign as well as nefarious, some sort of rule 
is needed to distinguish between these two possibilities so that benign tipping 
is allowed or even encouraged while nefarious tipping is prohibited and 
sanctioned. The vast confusion in insider trading law reflects the inability of 
the current legal landscape to grapple with the various subjective contexts in 
which insider trading can occur. Through its tipping taxonomy, this Article 
strives to establish scaffolding upon which a more context-specific legal 
treatment for insider trading can be built. 
 
I. DIRKS V. SEC: THE INVENTION OF THE PERSONAL BENEFIT TEST 
 
The landmark case of Dirks v. SEC18 shows the stark difference bet-
ween the Supreme Court’s approach to insider trading and the SEC’s approach 
to such trading. The fact pattern depicts one of several contexts in which the 
SEC would have banned insider trading, while the Court indicated that such 
trading should not merely be tolerated but actively encouraged.  
In 1973, the SEC sued and censured Raymond Dirks, a securities 
analyst who specialized in evaluating publicly traded insurance companies, 
for tipping The Wall Street Journal and some of his firm’s trading clients 
about a massive fraud that he had uncovered at the insurance company Equity 
																																								 																				
18 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
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Funding.19 The prosecution of Mr. Dirks reflected the delivery on a promise 
that then-SEC Chair John Shad had made while decrying the fact that insider 
trading was perceived as widespread and expressing his concern that such 
trading had undermined investor confidence in the capital markets.20 In his 
remarks, Chairman Shad promised that the SEC would “come down with 
hobnail boots to give some shocking examples to inhibit the activity.”21 
Similarly, then-Director of Enforcement at the SEC John Fedders described 
insider trading as “stealing by people in white shirts and suspenders.”22 
Unmoved by the fact that Dirks had played a major role in uncovering 
the fraud at Equity Funding, the SEC maintained that Dirks had committed 
securities fraud because his tips enabled trading on the basis of material non-
public information before such information was disclosed to the public.23 The 
Supreme Court rejected the SEC’s decision to take enforcement action against 
Dirks and admonished the Commission for ignoring its prior ruling in 
Chiarella v. United States.24 The Court reiterated that it is only illegal to trade 
on inside information when such trading is done in breach of a pre-existing 
fiduciary-like obligation of trust and confidence to the source of the 
information.25 In Dirks, the Supreme Court again explicitly rejected the SEC’s 
view that anyone who received non-public information from a corporate 
insider automatically “inherited” the insider’s legal obligation to either make 
the information public or abstain from trading.26 Rather, the Court clarified that 
liability for trading on the basis of tips from insiders depends on whether the 
insider-tipper breached a fiduciary duty when she provided the tip.27  
 
																																								 																				
19 Linda Greenhouse, Dirks Gets His Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 1983), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/03/22/business/dirks-gets-his-day-in-court.html. 
20 Fair to All People:  The SEC and the Regulation of Insider Trading, SEC HIST. SOC’Y, 
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/counterAttack_c.php (last visited Sept. 
3, 2016).  
21 Kenneth B. Noble, S.E.C. Chief Plans Insider Trade Curb, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1981, 
at D1. 
22 Illegal Insider Trading Seems to Be on Rise; Ethics Issues Muddled, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 
1984, at 1. 
23 Fair to All People, supra note 7. 
24 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
25 463 U.S. 646, 656-57 (1983) (characterizing the SEC’s stance as “differ[ing] little from 
the view that we rejected as inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella,” and that 
“conflicts with the principle set forth in Chiarella that only some persons, under some 
circumstances, will be barred from trading while in possession of material nonpublic 
information”). 
26 Fair to All People, supra note 7. 
27 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664. 
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A. The SEC vs. the Courts: Fairness or Efficiency? A Philosophical 
Impasse 
 
The disagreement between the SEC and the courts on insider trading 
doctrine is based on a firm and irreconcilable difference about the root 
justification for regulating insider trading. The SEC, firmly embedded in its 
bureaucratic role of protecting the securities markets, rejects the premise that 
material non-public information is a form of intellectual property. Accordingly, 
the SEC also rejects the idea that socially desirable trading based on such 
information is possible. As such, the SEC does not countenance any trading on 
the basis of informational asymmetries, even that which is done to glean the 
rewards of costly and socially desirable research into fundamental company 
values or to reveal an ongoing corporate fraud. Rejecting the view that trading 
can at least potentially advance a number of valuable social goals, the SEC is of 
the view that anyone in possession of material non-public information should 
be forbidden to use it at all, ever.28 Only after the relevant information on which 
the trading is based has been public can it be used, according to the SEC.29   
The SEC’s view is that insider trading must be prohibited because it is 
unfair to the trader’s counter-party. As a consequence of this view, the SEC 
believes that those “who possess material non-public information, must 
disclose it before trading or abstain from trading until the information is 
publicly disseminated.”30 The fairness approach presupposes that trading on 
the basis of material non-public information “operates as a fraud [sic] all other 
buyers and sellers in the market.”31   
In contrast, the Court, abjuring conclusory, unspecified notions of 
“fairness” and embracing empirically verifiable concepts such as property 
rights and efficiency, rejects the SEC’s equal treatment philosophy and its 
concomitant “disclose or abstain” doctrine. The Court’s 1980 decision in 
Chiarella v. U.S.32 was the watershed opinion that rejected the SEC’s fairness 
approach and embraced a property rights approach that focused on the 
allocation of rights to trading that are created by employment contracts and 
other agreements creating relationships of trust and confidence between the 
																																								 																				
28 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); see also Thomas C. Newkirk, Associate 
Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Speech at 16th International Symposium on Economic 
Crime (Sept. 19, 1998) (citing Cady, Roberts), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech 
archive/1998/spch221.htm. 
29 Id. 
30 Fair to All People, supra note 7. 
31 Newkirk, supra note 14 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), 
in which the court had adopted the SEC’s reasoning in Cady, Roberts).  
32 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
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companies that create information and the people to whom such information 
must be entrusted.33 Three years later, Dennis Carlton and Daniel Fischel were 
the first formally to conceptualize insider trading law as seeking to establish 
the efficient allocation of property rights in information.”34 
The practical differences between the SEC’s fairness approach and the 
Court’s property rights approach are significant. For example, a trader in 
possession of inside information can satisfy the SEC’s demand for fairness 
simply by publicly disclosing the information in her possession (or directly to 
her counter-party if the transaction will not occur on a registered stock 
exchange or Alternative Trading System, such as a dark pool).35 Suppose, for 
example, that a lawyer in a large law firm came into possession of the material 
non-public information that one of her firm’s clients was about to make a bid 
to purchase all of the shares of a large publicly traded company at a substantial 
premium over that company’s current market price. Suppose further that the 
lawyer, seeing a great profit-making opportunity, bought shares in the target 
company before the client made its bid, and made a tidy profit selling the newly 
acquired shares to her client. The SEC would view the lawyer’s trading as 
illegal because of the unfairness to the selling shareholders who lacked the 
critical information upon which the lawyer’s purchases were predicated. The 
lawyer would not have violated the insider trading prohibitions, under the 
SEC’s fairness test if she had erased her unfair advantage over her counter-
parties by disclosing the information about the bid publicly before buying 
shares in the target company.   
The Court would view the issue presented by the lawyer’s trading on 
material non-public information entirely differently. For the Court, the lawyer’s 
legal problems arise not from the unfairness to the purchasing lawyer’s counter-
party, but from the breach of the obligation of trust and confidence to her firm’s 
client that was reflected in her pre-bid purchases.   
Starting with the premise that the client necessarily had to invest sig-
nificant resources in identifying the target company, researching the arbitrage 
opportunities associated with determining that the target was undervalued due 
to its poor management or its inability to avail itself of possible synergies by 
																																								 																				
33 Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract:  The New Direction of the Rules Against 
Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984). 
34 Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. 
REV.  857, 866-72 (1983); see also JONATHAN R. MACEY. INSIDER TRADING:  ECONOMICS, 
POLITICS, AND POLICY 4 (1991) (“[T)he debate about insider trading is really a debate about 
how to allocate a property right within a firm.”). 
35 See 17 C.F.R. 242.300(a) (defining “alternative trading system” as an organization or system 
that “constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place or facilities for bringing together 
purchasers and sellers of securities . . . and [t]hat does not . . . [s]et rules governing the conduct 
of subscribers . . . or [d]iscipline subscribers other than by exclusion from trading”). 
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combining with another company, the Court’s efficiency approach sees the 
harm done not to the trader’s counter-party, who lacked any relationship with 
the trading lawyer, but to the bidding client. In other words, eschewing the 
SEC’s fairness approach, the Court’s efficiency approach seeks to protect the 
bidding firm’s property rights in the information that the target company is 
undervalued, thereby presenting an arbitrage opportunity in the market for 
corporate control. From an efficiency standpoint, the harm caused by the 
insider’s buying in advance of her client’s bid is twofold. First the purchasing 
risks driving up the price of the target company’s shares, thereby damaging the 
client by increasing the costs of its acquisition of the target. Second, the 
purchasing might attract the interest of market professionals, who are experts 
at “decoding” the signals sent by the insider’s purchases, and who might well 
be able to determine that a bid for all of the shares of the target company is 
imminent.36 If this happened, the price of the target company’s stock could rise 
to such a high price that the arbitrage gains anticipated by the bidder would 
evaporate and the takeover would no longer be economically viable for the 
bidder. Damages in such a case would be in the billions. 
Applying this approach it is easy to see that the SEC’s “disclose to the 
market or abstain from trading” doctrine is not only unhelpful in protecting the 
property rights of the bidder, it is extremely counter-productive because it would 
entirely undermine the bidder’s efforts to keep the information confidential. 
Protecting the bidder’s property rights in information requires that the lawyer not 
only abstain from trading, but also refrain entirely from disclosing the infor-
mation, and that is what the Court mandates in Chiarella and Dirks.   
Basic issues such as standing to sue, damages calculations, and 
substantive legal requirements differ dramatically under the fairness approach 
and the efficiency approach. Under the SEC’s fairness approach, logic requires 
that the shareholders in the target company who sold while the insider/lawyer 
was buying should have standing to sue because they were the group that was 
treated unfairly by the insider’s buying. In contrast, from an efficiency 
perspective, the party damaged and whose financial interests are protected by 
the insider trading law is the lawyer’s client, who risks losing the capacity to 
profit from its costly search in locating and evaluating the target company. In 
addition, failures to protect the bidder’s property rights in information about 
																																								 																				
36 See Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Jr., Signaling with Dividends, Stock Repurchases, 
and Equity Issues, 15 FIN. MGMT. 27, 41 n.18 (1986) (noting that traders routinely lower the 
price they are willing to pay when buying from sellers whom they suspect possess superior 
information, and raise their reservation price when selling to investors who may have 
superior information); Myron Scholes, The Market for Securities:  Substitution Versus Price 
Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. BUS. 179, 200 (1972) 
(asserting that sophisticated market participants can decode the signals contained in trades 
by informed investors). 
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the target also are inefficient in a broader sense because the economy as a 
whole improves when the target company’s assets are reallocated to the bidder, 
who clearly values them more highly as evidenced by its willingness to pay a 
premium to acquire control of such assets. These broad efficiency gains are 
reflected in the premium that all of the target company’s shareholders obtain 
when the bid is made, as well as the gains to the bidding company’s 
shareholders if the target company’s performance improves sufficiently (or 
synergies between the target and bidder are realized) after the takeover.   
With respect to damages, under the fairness approach favored by the 
SEC, the damages caused by the above insider trading scenario are measured 
by the difference between the price at which the target company’s shareholders 
sold their shares to the insider/lawyer and the price they would have received 
if they had been in possession of the same information about the impending 
takeover bid the insider/purchaser possessed. In contrast, under the efficiency 
approach, the private measure of damages would be the increase in the cost of 
acquiring the target caused by the increase in the target company’s share price 
linked to the insider’s purchases, the decrease in the number of shares that the 
bidder could acquire, and even the lost value of the deal if the insider trading 
resulted in the bidder having to withdraw its bid. As noted above, the 
substantive legal requirements imposed by the securities laws under the SEC’s 
approach are satisfied merely by disclosure of the material non-public 
information. Under the efficiency approach, the law imposes the more rigorous 
obligation of confidentiality and abstention from trading.   
From an economic point of view, judicial decisions have caused insider 
trading law to evolve from an amorphous concept that attempted to achieve the 
vague and (as will be shown below) unattainable objective of somehow making 
trading markets “fair” into a meaningful tool for controlling agency costs 
within a firm.37 Trading by agents of the firm, whether they are actually 
employees of the company or “temporary insiders”38 such as the attorney 
James O’Hagan, the defendant in United States v. O’Hagan, or the financial 
																																								 																				
37 From an economic perspective, shareholders, like other participants in the corporate 
enterprise such as creditors and employees, define their relationship with the firm in 
contractual terms.  Indeed, the very existence and survival of the corporate form of business 
organization can be explained by the gains associated with dividing the management and 
risk-bearing attributes of ownership into separate components through incorporation.  See 
Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 291-93 (1980).  
38 This concept of a “temporary insider” derives from a footnote in the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Dirks v. SEC.  The Dirks Court noted that insider trading liability could extend to 
non-employee outsiders who “have entered into a special confidential relationship in the 
conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for 
corporate purposes.”  The Court cited underwriters, accountants, lawyers, and consultants as 
examples of temporary insiders.  Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).   
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printer Vincent Chiarella, the defendant in Chiarella v. U.S., harms the 
shareholders of the company whose capacity to profit from their corporation’s 
buying and selling in the capital markets is thwarted by insiders trading on 
knowledge of the corporation’s plans. 
The SEC’s fairness approach is quite compelling at first blush, but it is 
logically infirm. From a fairness perspective, banning the insider/lawyer from 
trading accomplishes nothing. From the point of view of property rights in 
intellectual property, regulating insiders’ ability to trade accomplishes a great 
deal in terms of efficiency.   
In our hypothetical, banning insider trading from a fairness point of 
view accomplishes nothing because if the lawyer/insider is successfully barred 
from trading, the group that ostensibly would have been harmed by such 
trading (the target company’s shareholders) simply will end up selling their 
shares to the lawyer’s client, the acquirer. The target shareholders, of course, 
are indifferent between selling at the low, pre-bid price to the lawyer/insider 
and selling at the same low, pre-bid price to the acquirer/client. On the other 
hand, a successful prohibition on trading by the insider/lawyer has clear 
benefits from an efficiency point of view because it enables the putative 
acquirer to obtain an economic return on its investments in searching for and 
analyzing undervalued companies.39   
In the preceding paragraph I used the example of a takeover bid at a 
premium over the target company’s share price to illustrate the futility of 
achieving fairness through a “disclose or abstain” rule. Ultimately, the rule 
merely ends up substituting the company making the bid for the insider or 
temporary insider who would have traded if not prohibited from doing so by 
insider trading law. From the perspective of the uninformed selling shareholder, 
																																								 																				
39 The SEC has curtailed, but not eliminated, the ability of acquirers to capture the full gains 
of their costly search and analysis by requiring them to disclose their identity and plans 
within ten days after acquiring a five percent stake in a publicly traded target company.  
Securities Exchange Act, Rule 13-d, Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. 240.13d-1, 240.13d-7 (1986).  
While in theory it is possible for a bidder to acquire 100% of a target company’s stock within 
ten days of crossing the five percent threshold, as a practical matter, such a rapid flurry of 
purchases would drive the target company’s share price prohibitively high.  Jonathan R. 
Macey & Jeffry M. Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process, 65 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 131 (1987); see also David D. Haddock, Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, 
Resistance to Tender Offers and Optimal Property Rights in Assets, 73 VA. L. REV. 701 
(1987); Gregg A. Jarrell & Michael Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State 
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371 (1980) (observing that Regulation 
13D and other regulations that require immediate disclosure of information about an 
acquirer’s identity and plans have diluted acquiring firms’ property rights in information and 
led to significant welfare losses by reducing searches for undervalued firms and reducing the 
incidence of wealth creating transactions, such as synergy-creating mergers, and hostile 
acquisitions that displace inefficient or corrupt management). 
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of course the “disclose or abstain” rule in no way creates a level playing field. 
The asymmetric information problem persists. Only the identity of the seller’s 
counter-party changes.   
This is not the only flaw in the fairness approach. There are three other, 
more significant flaws. First, the approach is only fair if one considers fairness 
from the narrow perspective of the selling shareholders. Once the shareholders 
of the bidding firm are taken into account one immediately sees that, even if 
one were to assume that the selling shareholders benefitted from disclosure by 
the trading insider, this benefit simply would represent a wealth transfer from 
the shareholders of the bidding firm, who would have enjoyed the benefits of 
a lower acquisition price, to the shareholders of the target firm, who would 
have enjoyed the benefits of a higher acquisition price.   
Second, the wealth transfer described above would be accompanied by 
a dead weight social loss. The bidding firm, anticipating that the “disclose or 
abstain” rule would reduce the profitability of its search for undervalued 
targets, would invest less in such search. This, in turn, would have the 
inevitable consequence of leaving more companies in the hands of inept or 
dishonest management. The underperformance of these firms, with its 
concomitant drag on employment and productivity, represents an incalculable 
dead weight social loss.40 
Finally, as David Haddock and I have shown in previous work,41 if, as 
is universally the case, the shareholding populations of public companies are 
heterogeneous with respect to their ability to process the information disclosed 
to them by insiders, the “disclose or abstain” doctrine will not benefit all or 
even most target firm shareholders.  Rather, the subset of a company’s share-
holders who are market professionals such as hedge fund operators and 
professional traders in investment banking firms, will be the first to synthesize 
public disclosures by insiders and to effectuate trades in the capital markets 
based on those disclosures. These trades will cause the price of the relevant 
firm to adjust to its new, “correct”42 level, so that, yet again, the “true outsiders” 
who are the “very average investors” that the SEC purports to protect with its 
“disclose or abstain” rule end up selling their shares before the share price has 
adjusted to reflect the new information. Thus, the SEC’s fairness approach, 
																																								 																				
40 The loss is incalculable because there is no way to measure how many additional 
reallocations of underutilized assets would be effectuated if a more efficient set of rules was 
in place. 
41 See generally David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand:  A Private 
Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311 
(1987); Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, A Coasean Model of Insider Trading, 80 
NW. U. L. REV. 1449 (1986). 
42 Correct in the sense that it has adjusted to reflect the previously non-public material 
information upon which the insider trading was predicated. 
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reflected in the “disclose or abstain” doctrine does not actually make the 
markets fairer. It simply shifts the beneficiaries of the asymmetric information 
away from insiders and towards market professionals. 
 
B. A Strange Turn in Doctrinal Development: The Personal  
Benefit Test 
 
After reaffirming the property rights orientation of the Court that was 
established in Chiarella, the Dirks opinion takes a strange doctrinal turn. The 
test developed to determine when a tip is made in breach of a fiduciary duty is 
the personal benefit test. The personal benefit test, as its name implies, posits 
that it is impermissible for tipping and trading to occur when the tipper receives 
a personal benefit in exchange for the information. If a tipper receives a 
personal benefit, then the tip violates the tipper’s fiduciary duty, and the tippee 
may not trade. Stranger still, by parity of reasoning, Dirks stands for the 
proposition that, if a tipper receives no personal benefit in exchange for his tip, 
then unconstrained trading on the basis of the tip is entirely permissible.  
The SEC had long hoped to avoid a legal rule requiring a showing of 
an improper motive by a tipper or a trader.43 But most believed that after the 
Court’s decision in Dirks, “[a] finding of insider trading liability would 
thereafter turn, to a great extent, on the motive of the insider, on whether the 
‘insider personally benefited, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure,’”44 
which of course was precisely what the SEC had long hoped to avoid.45  
The personal benefit test, however, is not a particularly accurate tool 
for discerning motive. Someone who receives a personal benefit for doing 
something can nonetheless have motives that are pure. An attorney who works 
as a paid public defender receives a pecuniary benefit (salary) for her work, 
and yet may be motivated primarily by a desire to do good. Ronald Secrist, 
Raymond Dirks’ primary tipper, was deemed by the Court in Dirks to have had 
pure motives because he received no personal benefit for his tip. But this is not 
necessarily the case.  Secrist might have been a disgruntled employee who had 
been passed over for a promotion, and was motivated purely by a desire for 
revenge. Likewise, if one imagines a hypothetical case that mimics the facts of 
Dirks exactly, except that in the hypothetical case the tipper gets cash in 
addition to the psychological satisfaction of putting an end to a massive fraud, 
																																								 																				
43 Fair to All People, supra note 7.  
44 Id. 
45 Id.; see also A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and the Counterrevolution in the 
Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 927-42 (2003) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
deliberation over the law behind insider trading and the role of motive in convicting an 
individual under the SEC’s rules). 
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it is not clear why the tipper’s receipt of cash should lead to liability. In sum, 
if the goal is to create a test capable of discerning the motivation of the tipper, 
the personal benefit test is a poor tool.  It does not capture all instances of venal 
tipping, and it captures some tipping that is not entirely or even mostly venal.   
It is, perhaps, more apt to view the personal benefit test not as a litmus 
test of the motives of insiders who engage in tipping, but rather as an 
assessment of the effects that trading on the basis of such tipping has on capital 
markets. To the extent that some trading benefits capital markets by exposing 
fraud and making the prices of financial assets more accurate, it should be 
encouraged because the increased accuracy of stock prices improves allocative 
efficiency and increases societal wealth.   
More accurate securities prices lead to greater allocative efficiency 
because, when companies with better prospects enjoy higher securities prices, 
they can access capital at a lower cost and reward the investors who have 
identified such firms, the entrepreneurs who founded such firms, and the 
managers whose efforts increased the value of such firms. Companies that have 
poor prospects will have more difficulty raising capital if prices are accurate.   
On the other hand, other insider trading harms capital markets by 
depriving the companies who actually create such information from profiting 
from the costly investments that led to that information being created in the first 
place. The Supreme Court encountered just such a situation in U.S. v. O’Hagan,46 
in which a giant British food company, Grand Met, hired a Minneapolis law firm, 
Dorsey & Whitney, to advise it in its campaign to take over Pillsbury.47 A lawyer 
at Dorsey & Whitney, James O’Hagan, got his hands on the material insider 
information that Grand Met was making a play for Pillsbury before Grand Met 
could begin buying shares in Pillsbury.48 O’Hagan then made significant profits 
buying Pillsbury stock and stock options and other derivative instruments linked 
to the value of Pillsbury stock before Grand Met announced its bid, and then 
selling those securities post announcement of the bid.49 O’Hagan legitimated the 
so-called “misappropriation” theory of insider trading, according to which 
insider trading is illegal when the trader commits fraud by misappropriating 
information that rightfully belongs to the source of the inside information.    
The misappropriation theory posited that the information that Grand 
Met wanted to acquire Pillsbury shares at a significant premium over market 
belonged to the company that created that information: Grand Met. By trading 
																																								 																				
46 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
47 Id. at 648. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. (noting that after the announcement, O'Hagan “sold his Pillsbury call options and 
common stock, making a profit of more than $4.3 million”). 
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on that information, O’Hagan was stealing (misappropriating) information 
from Grand Met that had been entrusted to the law firm where O’Hagan 
worked. As a partner in that firm, O’Hagan had a contractual duty, not to 
mention an ethical duty, to refrain from trading on the basis of information 
given to his firm in confidence by a client. By trading, O’Hagan breached his 
duty of trust and confidence. And he went to jail when he was caught.50  
There is no question that defendant O’Hagan had venal motives when 
he purloined the information about Grand Met’s impending bid for Pillsbury 
and traded on it. The harm in O’Hagan, however, was not caused by 
O’Hagan’s quest for illicit trading profits. The harm was caused by the change 
in securities prices spawned by O’Hagan’s purchases. The natural effect of 
O’Hagan’s trading was to drive up the price of Pillsbury stock. Every cent by 
which Pillsbury’s share price increased constituted an increase in the price that 
O’Hagan’s client, Grand Met, would have to pay for those shares. Worse, this 
increase signaled to astute Wall Street stock watchers the existence of an 
impending tender offer for Pillsbury shares, which might have ruined Grant 
Met’s plans entirely by rendering the acquisition of Pillsbury shares prohi-
bitively expensive. 
Thus from a capital markets perspective, O’Hagan’s motives were 
irrelevant. Even if O’Hagan received no personal benefit, his conduct should 
have been deemed illegal. Suppose, for example, that O’Hagan had not traded 
on the information, but had instead passed it along to a trader. Under the personal 
benefit test developed in Dirks, O’Hagan’s culpability would hinge on whether 
he received a personal benefit in exchange for his tip. But it is not at all clear 
why this should be the case. The harm to Grand Met and the damage to capital 
markets is still the same, regardless of whether O’Hagan breached his confiden-
tiality obligation to his client by tipping for free or for something of value.   
Thus, for the Supreme Court, the personal benefit test is the central 
focus of the inquiry into whether trading on the basis of an insider’s tip is 
illegal, despite the fact that the personal benefit test is a rather crude test for 
determining motive. For its part, the SEC views the motive of the tipper as 
irrelevant because the SEC views the legal propriety of insider trading not 
through the lens of property rights and misappropriation, but from the point of 
view of “fairness,” where fairness is defined as parity of information.   
The rather simplistic approaches of both the SEC and the Supreme 
Court make it possible to illustrate the differences between the approach to 
tipper liability taken by the SEC and the Court in the following chart: 
																																								 																				
50 O'Hagan was convicted of theft in state court, sentenced to thirty months’ imprisonment, 
and fined.  See State v. O’Hagan, 474 N.W. 2d 613, 615, 623 (Minn. App. 1991).  The 
Supreme Court of Minnesota disbarred O’Hagan from the practice of law.  See In re 
O’Hagan, 450 N.W. 2d 571 (1990). 
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TIPPEE LIABILITY 
Motive for Tip SEC Federal Courts 
Personal benefit shown: Yes Yes 
No proof of personal benefit shown: Yes No 
 
Thus, the decades-long battle between the SEC and the federal courts 
stems from the fact that the SEC declines to countenance even the possibility 
that some instances of tipping on the basis of material non-public information 
might be permissible. Because the SEC takes the view that the only possible 
motivations for tipping are nefarious, it would categorically ban all trading 
following tips of material non-public information.   
The Supreme Court has taken a decidedly different view. Federal 
courts are of the view that trading on the basis of insider tips about fraud, or on 
the basis of tips provided for some valid corporate purpose are beneficial, not 
harmful to markets and should be encouraged. The personal benefit test in 
Dirks reflects the Court’s initial attempt to distinguish wrongful insider trading 
from beneficial insider trading that should be encouraged. 
 
II. TIPPING: A MORE COMPLETE TAXONOMY 
 
The simple taxonomy in the above chart does not cover every possible 
context in which trading on the basis of a tip from an insider might occur.   
For example, in United States v. Salman,51 U.S. District Judge Jed 
Rakoff of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation on the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, indicated that tipping might occur not 
only for pecuniary gains (O’Hagan) or to expose fraud (Dirks), but also simply 
by accident or mistake. As Judge Rakoff observed, “whistleblowing quite 
aside, corporate insiders, in the many conversations they typically have with 
stock analysts, often accidentally or mistakenly disclose material information 
that is not immediately available to the public.”52   
While it seems obvious that Judge Rakoff is right in observing that 
insider trading sometimes occurs by accident or mistake, the tipping in the 
Salman case itself was done on purpose and not by accident or mistake, and 
the Supreme Court, in affirming Judge Rakoff’s decision, does not expand on 
the issue.53  
																																								 																				
51 792 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
52 Id. (emphasis added). 
53 This point, however, was worth making because Justice Powell’s decision in Dirks does 
not consider the possibility of accidental or mistaken tipping.  What is strange about Judge 
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In stark contrast to Salman, in both Dirks and U.S. v. Newman,54 federal 
courts have focused with laser-like precision on what they view as insider 
trading that serves a valid corporate purpose in ordinary corporate commun-
ications that does not involve whistleblowing or serendipitous mistake.   
The historical record is quite clear that Justice Powell, who wrote the 
majority opinions in both Dirks and in its illustrious progenitor: Chiarella v. 
U.S,55 expressed significant concern that without careful oversight from the 
Supreme Court, SEC regulation of insider trading “could impair market 
efficiency.”56 In particular, as Adam Pritchard trenchantly has observed, in 
Chiarella, Justice Powell “saw the SEC’s efforts to impose a ‘parity of 
information’ rule as undermining ‘incentives to perform market research in 
order to discover undervalued stocks and thereby bring about a more efficient 
allocation of resources.’”57 According to Pritchard, Justice Powell “agreed 
with a student author in the Harvard Law Review: ‘[t]he courts must also 
recognize . . . the importance of preserving incentives for legitimate economic 
effort, such as gathering new information or perceptively analyzing generally 
available facts.’”58  
In light of the important role played by efficiency analysis in the 
jurisprudence of insider trading, it is passing strange59 that Judge Rakoff did 
not entertain the possibility that benign tipping by insiders could be done for a 
reason other than whistleblowing and accident or mistake.    
Newman involved trading by Todd Newman, a portfolio manager at a 
hedge fund, Diamondback Capital Management, LLC, and Anthony Chiasson, 
a portfolio manager at another hedge fund, Level Global Investors, L.P., on the 
																																								 																				
Rakoff’s decision is that it fails to recognize any contexts in which justifiable trading might 
occur other than whistleblowing to reveal fraud or other illegal activity.  For Judge Rakoff, 
the “benign” category of insider trading, that which occurs for a valid business purpose, does 
not appear to exist. 
54 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015). 
55 445 U.S. 222 (1980).  
56 Pritchard, supra note 30, at 931. 
57 Id. (quoting Bench Memorandum, Chiarella v. United States, to Justice Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr., at 7 (Sept. 28, 1979)). 
58 Id. (quoting Justice Powell’s handwritten notes on the margins of a photocopy of Case 
Comment, The Application of Rule 10b-5 to “Market Insiders”:  United States v. Chiarella, 
92 HARV. L. REV. 1538, 1543 (1979)). 
59 Here I use the term “passing strange” to mean exceedingly strange, which is how the term 
was used by William Shakespeare in Othello and John Milton in Paradise Regained, as 
distinct from “moderately strange,” which is what the phrase has come to mean to some, 
including Chief Justice Roberts, in the 20th century.  (In 1985, John Roberts wrote to another 
White House aide that, “[i]t strikes me as more than passing strange for us to tell Congress 
it cannot pass a law preventing courts from ordering busing when our own Justice Depart-
ment invariably urges this policy on the courts.”) 
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basis of tips from investor relations officers at two public companies, Dell and 
NVIDIA, who were casual acquaintances of analysts at the hedge funds who 
worked for the portfolio managers. 60 The defendants established that it was 
common for insiders at Dell to disclose “confidential quarterly financial 
information arguably similar to the inside information disclosed by [the Dell 
defendants] to establish relationships with financial firms who might be in a 
position to buy Dell's stock.”61 Significantly, in Newman, the Second Circuit 
fully embraced the concept that there are legitimate and benign reasons why 
corporate insiders might want to disclose material, non-public information to 
stock market analysts and other capital market participants who follow their 
companies’ equity securities just as it had in Dirks. Unlike Judge Rakoff, the 
Second Circuit and the Supreme Court have recognized that such tipping might 
occur for reasons other than whistleblowing or accident or mistake. 
Specifically, in Dirks, the Court observed that: 
 
[I]mposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person 
knowingly receives material non-public information from an 
insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the 
role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is 
necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. It is common-
place for analysts to ‘ferret out and analyze information,’ and this 
often is done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers 
and others who are insiders. And information that the analysts 
obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market 
worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst’s judgment in this 
respect is made available in market letters or otherwise to clients 
of the firm. It is the nature of this type of information, and indeed 
of the markets themselves, that such information cannot be made 
simultaneously available to all of the corporation’s stockholders 
or the public generally.62   
 
Likewise, in Newman, the Second Circuit built on the Dirks Court’s 
point, which was that tipping that does not involve any theft or misappropriation 
of information, but that does move equity prices in the correct direction, is 
beneficial to markets and should be permitted. The court in Newman stressed in 
particular the testimony of one witness about how the corporate relations depart-
ments at public companies routinely operate. This witness: 
																																								 																				
60 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014), cert.  denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 
(2015). 
61 Id. at 454-55. 
62 Dirks v. United States, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983) (citations omitted). 
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testified that he frequently spoke to investor relations 
departments to run his [valuation] model by them and ask 
whether his assumptions were ‘too high or too low’ or in the 
‘ball park,’ which suggests analysts routinely updated numbers 
in advance of the earnings announcements. [Another witness 
from Dell’s corporate relations department] confirmed that 
investor relations departments routinely assisted analysts with 
developing their models.63 
 
Similarly, the Second Circuit found in Newman that “the evidence 
established that NVIDIA and Dell’s investor relations personnel routinely 
‘leaked’ earnings data in advance of quarterly earnings” announcements by the 
companies.64 The Newman court viewed this evidence as exculpatory for the 
trading defendants because the disclosures were deemed by the court to have 
furthered the interests of the companies (NVIDIA and Dell) whose employees 
made the disclosures. Specifically, the court held that even if the trading 
defendants had been able to discern from the nature of the data conveyed to 
them by their analysts that the tips they received were from an insider, the 
information they were given: 
 
cannot, without more, permit an inference as to that source’s 
improper motive for disclosure. That is especially true here, 
where the evidence showed that corporate insiders at Dell and 
NVIDIA regularly engaged with analysts and routinely selec-
tively disclosed the same type of information.65 
 
Following the economic framework suggested in Dirks, the Second 
Circuit’s opinion in Newman indicates that, as a descriptive matter, insiders who 
work in corporate communications departments and in the office of the Chief 
Financial Officer in public companies, who often are tasked with communicating 
information to analysts who work with traders at hedge funds and other financial 
firms, should be allowed to make those communications of non-public 
information for valid corporate purposes, notwithstanding the prohibitions in 
Regulation FD.66 The courts in Dirks and Newman explicitly recognize that such 
																																								 																				
63 Newman, 773 F.3d at 454 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 455 
66 While Regulation FD mandates that all publicly traded companies disclose material, non-
public information to all investors at the same time, the sanctions are tepid, and it is not clear 
whether the Regulation has had much effect on corporate behavior.  See Report of 
Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:  Netflix, 
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tipping can serve legitimate corporate purposes such as promoting analyst 
coverage and or correcting misperceptions in the trading community that lead to 
mispricing of the company’s shares. As an analytical matter, this tipping is done 
for a personal benefit, which is the tipper’s remuneration. But such tipping has 
not only been permitted, it has been endorsed in both Dirks and Newman. The 
courts simply have not recognized that the tipping in these cases is done for a 
personal benefit in the form of the tippers’ compensation. But the fact remains 
that the courts’ endorsement of systematic tipping by insiders for a valid corpor-
ate purpose establishes that it does not constitute securities fraud. 
Adding the fact that insider information can be transmitted by mistake 
or accident to: (a) the Dirks Court’s recognition that tipping can be a form of 
whistleblowing; (b) the Salman Court’s treatment of familial relationships; and 
(c) the Newman Court’s appreciation of the salutary effects of insider trading 
allows us to develop a much more complete taxonomy of insider trading. The 
remainder of this section of the Article provides examples of the various 
contexts in which tipping, both legal and illegal, might occur. 
 
A. Pecuniary Benefit 
 
Most obviously, tipping can occur because a venal insider wants to 
monetize her special access to material non-public information about an event 
at the company for which she works. For example, in the late spring of 2016, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice 
charged an investment banker, Steven McClatchey—who had regular access to 
highly confidential non-public information about impending deals being 
pursued for his firm’s investment bank clients—with providing this information 
to a plumber, Gary Pusey. Specifically, when Mr. McClatchey learned in the 
course of his investment banking work that a client company was going to 
acquire or be acquired by another company at a premium to market price, he 
would alert Mr. Pusey, who would then buy shares in the target company at the 
pre-acquisition price, making significant trading profits. Mr. Pusey, in return for 
this information, not only provided Mr. McClatchey with gym bags full of cash, 
but also with something money cannot buy: free plumbing services for Mr. 
McClatchey’s bathroom remodeling project.67 
																																								 																				
Inc., and Reed Hastings, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 69,279, [2012-2013 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,972 (Apr. 2, 2013) (disapproving, but not sanctioning 
Netflix President Reed Hastings’s use of his personal Facebook page to disclose important 
company news); see also Bruce A. Ericson, Regulation FD After Siebel Systems:  No Longer 
“The Hobgoblin of Little Minds”?, SEC. LITIG. REPORT (Nov. 2005).   
67 Complaint, SEC v. Steven V. McClatchey, 1:16-CV-04029, 2016 WL 3078744 (S.D.N.Y. 
filed May 31, 2016). 
                                  Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [June 2017 
 
 
46 
There is no question in anybody’s mind that this sort of trading is, and 
should be, illegal. 
 
B. Family Relationship 
 
United States v. Salman68 is the classic case in which the personal 
benefit test of Dirks is met by a showing that the offending tip was made as a 
gift to a family member. In Salman, Maher Kara, who worked in the Citigroup 
healthcare investment banking group, tipped his older brother Mounir 
(“Michael”) Kara, who became increasingly “brazen and more persistent in his 
requests for information.”69 In the midst of these conversations between 
brothers, Maher, the tipping brother, became engaged to the sister of one 
Bassam Salman, who got to know the family and became close friends with 
his future bother-in-law Michael. Michael began giving the information he got 
from his brother Maher to Salman, who traded on it in an account held in the 
name of yet another relative. So, Maher tipped his brother Michael, who tipped 
Maher’s future brother-in-law Salman.   
In his defense at trial, Salman argued that evidence of a friendship or 
familial relationship between tipper and tippee is insufficient to demonstrate 
that the tipper received a benefit, absent evidence of a “personal benefit” 
conferred upon the tipper Maher by his tippee Michael.70 This argument is 
clearly wrong as a matter of law because the Supreme Court explicitly held in 
Dirks that a violation of the law occurs “when an insider makes a gift of 
confidential information to a trading friend relative.”71   
A gift is, by definition, “something voluntarily transferred by one 
person to another without payment.”72 It cannot be the case that the government 
must show that the tipper received a benefit, but that apparently is what Salman 
argued in his unsuccessful appeal to the Ninth Circuit. As Judge Rakoff 
observed in his opinion in the case, the law of insider trading is crystal clear 
																																								 																				
68 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
69 Id. at 1088-89. 
70 Id. at 1090.  In Salman, Michael Kara, the tippee, in turn, tipped the defendant, Salman, 
but the court did not confront the issue, decided in Newman, of whether the government must 
prove that such a remote tippee had knowledge of the personal benefit that the insider-tipper 
received for disclosing inside information to the tipper because the jury in Salman was 
instructed that Salman “knew that Maher Kara personally benefitted in some way, directly 
or indirectly, from the disclosure of the allegedly inside information to Mounir (‘Michael’) 
Kara.”  Id. at 1091 n.2 (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 450). 
71 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983). 
72 MERRIAM-WEBSTER, SIMPLE DEFINITION OF GIFT, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dicti 
onary/gift (last visited Sept. 3, 2016). 
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that a familial relationship such as that permeating the facts of Salman is 
sufficient to satisfy Dirks’s personal benefit test. As Judge Rakoff noted, 
personal benefit is broadly defined to include “not only pecuniary gain, but 
also, inter alia, . . . the benefit one would obtain from simply making a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”73 
Thus, there is no doubt that it is illegal to trade on the basis of a tip from 
a relative or close friend.  Establishing that a defendant traded on the basis of 
a tip from a relative should be enough. The argument that the government must 
prove both a familial connection and a quid pro quo in order to obtain an insider 
trading conviction is both odd and untenable. As the Supreme Court held in 
Salman v. United States, “[t]o the extent that the Second Circuit held that the 
tipper must also receive something of a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ 
in exchange for a gift to family or friends, Newman . . . we agree with the Ninth 
Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks.”74 Insider trading on 
the basis of a tip from a close friend or relative is illegal all by itself. 
 
C. Accidents, Mistakes and Intentional Tipping with No Personal Benefit 
 
1. Accidents and Mistakes 
 
As noted above, Judge Rakoff in Salman condones insider trading on 
the basis of tips that are passed along by mistake. The basis for condoning 
trading on the basis of accidental or mistaken tips is found in in Dirks. Where 
a tip is passed along by happenstance, prosecutors are unable to obtain a 
conviction because they are unable to meet the personal benefit test in Dirks.   
The strange fact that it is legal to trade on the basis of a tip that is passed 
along as a result of carelessness on the part of the tipper reflects poorly on the 
personal benefit test. The most fundamental tenet of Supreme Court juris-
prudence on insider trading is that there can be no liability for trading on the 
basis of material non-public information unless such trading is in breach of a 
fiduciary duty.  To the extent that the personal benefit test is inconsistent with 
the fiduciary duty element of insider trading law, the test is suspect. 
Trading on the basis of material non-public information is wrong when 
there is an abuse of a “relationship affording access to inside information 
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose” and not for the personal 
benefit of anyone, due to the “unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take 
advantage of [insider information] by trading without disclosure.”75   
																																								 																				
73 Salman, 792 F.3d at 1093. 
74 Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016) (internal citation and alteration omitted). 
75 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
S.E.C. 907, 912, 912 n.15 (1961)). 
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Where an insider trades on information she has received as the result 
of a mistake on the part of the tipper, and the insider knows that the information 
is in her possession because of a mistake on the part of the insider/tipper, then 
it stands to reason that the trader inherits the insider’s fiduciary obligation to 
keep the information confidential. As Dirks made clear, a trading “tippee’s 
duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider’s duty” to keep 
the information confidential.76 In other words, an insider is in a relationship 
affording access to information intended for a corporate purpose and not for 
the personal benefit of anyone just as much when she tips by mistake as when 
she tips for cash. And trading by a tippee on the basis of information obtained 
by mistake is plagued by as much “inherent unfairness” when the information 
was received because of a mistake on the part of the tipper as when the 
information is received in exchange for cash or some other personal benefit. 
Turning to the issue of fiduciary duties in instances of tipping by 
accident or mistake as distinct from tipping in return for a personal benefit, 
there is a transparent breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty when an insider 
“sells out” by disclosing in exchange for cash or other emoluments. The 
particular duty violated in this case is the fiduciary duty of loyalty. But the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty is not the only fiduciary duty. There also exists a 
fiduciary duty of care, which obligates fiduciaries to act with the care of a 
reasonably prudent person in the discharge of their responsibilities. Just as the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty is the appropriate test when traders and tippers put 
their own personal interests ahead of the firm’s, the fiduciary duty of care is 
the applicable test when a tipper fails to act reasonably to manage the 
confidential information entrusted to their care and a trader exploits the tipper’s 
carelessness by trading on the information. 
The argument for employing a negligence perspective to trading on the 
basis of accident or mistake seems particularly strong when an insider’s 
responsibilities require interacting with stock market analysts at hedge funds 
and other trading operations, as was the case in Newman.77 In this context, 
																																								 																				
76 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659. 
77 An issue that must be confronted in imposing liability for negligent tipping is whether 
negligence is sufficient to trigger the applicable scienter requirement for liability.  Certainly 
a strong argument can be made that public policy favors liability for negligent securities 
fraud.  See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 690 (1980) (holding “that allegations of simple 
negligence [can] not sustain a private cause of action for damages under § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5”).  The rejection of negligence as a suitable form of scienter is based on the language 
of § 10(b), which uses the terms “manipulative,” “device,” and “contrivance,” purportedly 
evincing a “a congressional intent to proscribe only ‘knowing or intentional misconduct.’”  
Id. at 690 (citations omitted).  Nonetheless, Justice Blackmun has argued that public policy 
favors liability for negligent securities fraud.  Id. at 716-17 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part 
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acting reasonably requires the insider to use appropriate care in safeguarding 
the information entrusted to her. Oddly missing from defenses of tippers who 
“mistakenly” or “accidentally” provide hedge fund managers and other 
investment professionals with material non-public information, including 
Judge Rakoff’s in Salman, is any consideration of the fact that the tip reflects 
a breach of the fiduciary duty of care on the part of the insider. 
A particularly notorious case of accidental tipping involved former 
Dallas Cowboys football coach Barry Switzer.78 At the time of the insider 
trading incident, Mr. Switzer was a college football coach in Norman, 
Oklahoma. On June 6, 1981, Mr. Switzer, along with several hundred other 
spectators, attended a high school track meet being held at a field on the 
University of Oklahoma campus. Mr. Switzer, who was there to watch his son 
compete in an event, arrived at the track between 10:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. 
George and Linda Platt, who also had a son competing at the track event, 
arrived just before Switzer, sometime between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. Mr. 
Platt was the Chairman of the Board of Directors of a publicly held oil 
exploration and development enterprise called Texas International Company, 
and he and his wife were acquaintances of Mr. Switzer. At the time of the track 
meet, Texas International owned over fifty percent of the shares in another 
energy exploration and development business, Phoenix Resources Company, 
and had just decided two days before the track meet to retain the investment 
bank Morgan Stanley to initiate a sale of Phoenix.  
																																								 																				
and dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (“[W]hen misinformation causes loss, it is small 
comfort to the investor to know that he has been bilked by negligent mistake rather than by 
fraudulent design . . . . [I]njunctions against negligent dissemination of misinformation play 
an essential role in preserving market integrity and preventing serious financial loss.”); see 
also SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1978) (observing that “impressive 
policies” support SEC authority to seek relief against securities fraud caused by negligence).  
Moreover, recklessness appears to satisfy the scienter requirement of section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) did not address “the question 
whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”  Id. at 193 n.12.  Nonetheless, it did note that several circuits had 
held that “reckless disregard for the truth” could constitute scienter in a securities fraud 
action.  Id.  Moreover, the Second Circuit has held that “reckless conduct satisfies the scienter 
requirement.”  Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46 (2d Cir. 1978) (citations 
omitted). The court “recognized that recklessness may serve as a surrogate concept for 
willful fraud,” given that the “common law tort of fraud has adopted a recklessness standard 
as one means of satisfying the requisite intent element of that cause of action.”  Id. (citations 
omitted). Although recklessness may not meet the willfulness requirement for criminal 
liability (see 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (predicating liability upon a showing that the individual 
“willfully” or “willfully and knowingly” violated this provision)), it is sufficient to meet the 
scienter test for civil liability. 
78 SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984). 
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The district court found the information that Texas International 
planned to liquidate Phoenix and to retain an investment banking firm to assist 
in the transaction was non-public information that “a reasonable investor 
would consider important.”79   
According to the trial court, at some point during the track meet,  
 
Switzer laid down on a row of bleachers behind the Platts . . . 
While Switzer was sunbathing, he overheard [George] Platt 
talking to his wife about . . . . Morgan Stanley and his desire to 
dispose of or liquidate Phoenix. . . . Switzer also overheard that 
an announcement of a ‘possible’ liquidation of Phoenix might 
occur the following Thursday.80  
 
The district court also seemed to accept testimony that Mr. Platt was 
not aware that Mr. Switzer was within earshot when he was chatting with his 
wife about the sale of his company’s subsidiary,81 indicating that the court was 
entirely convinced of the veracity of Mr. Platt’s testimony. 
Immediately after the track meet, Mr. Switzer went home, looked up 
the share price of Phoenix and met with Sedwyn Kennedy, a friend of Switzer 
with whom he invested through a partnership called SKS. Mr. Switzer told Mr. 
Kennedy that he had overheard a conversation about the possible liquidation 
of Phoenix and that the transaction was likely either to occur or be announced 
within a few days. Mr. Switzer revealed to Mr. Kennedy that his source for this 
stock tip was a “gentlemen who was an executive with TIC.”82 According to 
the trial court, Switzer and Kennedy were “close friends” who had known one 
another for a long time.83 Messrs. Switzer and Kennedy agreed that buying 
Phoenix stock would be a good idea.   
Mr. Switzer purchased 35,000 shares of Phoenix stock through a variety 
of partnerships with various friends and made significant trading profits. 
According to the trial court, TIC’s Mr. Platt did not receive any “direct or 
indirect pecuniary gain nor any reputational benefit likely to translate into future 
earnings due to Switzer’s inadvertent receipt of the information regarding 
Phoenix.”84 While this may be the case, it seems doubtful. Mr. Platt and Mr. 
Switzer knew each other well. Mr. Platt’s company was a sponsor of Mr. 
																																								 																				
79 Id. at 760. 
80 Id. at 762. 
81 Id. (“G. Platt was not conscious of Switzer's presence on the bleachers behind him that 
day, nor that Switzer had overheard any conversation.”).   
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 764. 
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Switzer’s football television show, “Play Back.”85 Mr. Platt was described by 
the trial court as “a supporter of Oklahoma University football” who had “met 
Switzer at a few social engagements prior to June of 1981.”86 Mr. Switzer had 
given autographs to Mr. Platt’s children, and had upgraded Mr. Platt’s season 
tickets to football games.87 Mr. Switzer had called Mr. Platt to importune him 
to continue to sponsor his television program.88 These personal relationships are 
far more extensive than those identified by the government in Newman.   
Without explanation or embellishment, the trial court simply concluded 
that “[Mr.] Platt did not breach a fiduciary duty to stockholders of Phoenix for 
purposes of Rule 10b-5 liability nor § 10(b) liability when he disclosed to his 
wife at the track meet of June 6, 1981, that there was going to be a possible 
liquidation of Phoenix.”89 It is true that Mr. Platt did not breach his fiduciary 
duties by telling his wife about the upcoming sale of Phoenix. He had a good 
reason for passing the information along:  apparently, Mr. Platt discussed the 
transaction with his wife “for the purpose of informing her of his up-coming 
business schedule so that arrangements for child care could be made.”90 
But the fact that passing along information to one’s spouse does not 
automatically represent a breach of one’s fiduciary duties does not mean that 
the manner in which such information is passed along is a matter of complete 
indifference from a legal point of view. It seems clear that, at some point, 
disclosure of material non-public information by “accident” or by “mistake” 
reflects such a degree of recklessness and disregard for the importance of 
protecting the confidentiality of such information that it constitutes a breach of 
fiduciary duty. Imagine, for example, that Mr. Platt had communicated the 
information by accidentally clicking the “Reply All” tab in a message from his 
assistant, causing the message to be sent to a large group of people outside of 
his company. It seems to me that, at some point, disclosure by “accident” or 
“mistake” reflects such a failure to take reasonable steps to protect the 
confidentiality of information entrusted to an insider that it violates the 
insider’s fiduciary duty of care.  
This point becomes stronger in light of the fact that safeguarding 
proprietary confidential information is an important part of the professional 
responsibilities of corporate officers and directors and the professionals they 
hire, particularly at public companies. Significant resources are devoted to 
																																								 																				
85 Id. at 761. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 766. 
90 Id. 
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protecting the confidentiality of all sorts of corporate information.91 Formal 
protocols govern the way that confidential and proprietary information is 
handled within companies and government.92 Casual, public conversations 
about confidential information, such as the one that resulted in the information 
leak in Switzer, are inconsistent with minimal standards of good corporate 
practice. As one large employer informed its supervisory employees: “Integrity 
requires congruence between your professional life and your personal habits. 
Conversations overheard, chats by the coffee pot, and information that comes 
to you accidentally needs to be treated with the same caution as a letter or e-
mail correspondence that lands on your desk.”93   
Despite the fact that ordinary and customary business practice and good 
corporate governance require that significant care be taken to guard against 
mistaken or accidental disclosure of confidential information, the district court 
in Switzer flatly held that “Rule 10b-5 does not bar trading on the basis of 
information inadvertently revealed by an insider.”94 This assertion seems 
wrong, particularly when the inadvertent disclosure of material non-public 
information reflects recklessness or negligence.  
From an economic standpoint, imposing civil liability on inadvertent 
tippers would be efficient. Inadvertent disclosure of proprietary non-public 
information can potentially lead to the collapse of deals that are significantly 
welfare enhancing not only because they generate change-in-control premia for 
target company shareholders, but also because they lead to business combi-
nations that increase the returns on the assets of both the acquirer and the 
acquired company by creating synergies and reducing costs. In contrast to these 
potentially significant welfare gains, the costs of requiring that insiders act with 
reasonable care in safeguarding information they obtain in the course of their 
work appear minimal.  
While complete security is not possible, taking steps to use encrypted 
files and secure connections and limiting conversations and other oral comm-
unications to appropriately secure locations has become routine and would not 
create significant additional costs for companies. For example, it is ordinary 
and customary practice for lawyers and investment bankers communicating 
																																								 																				
91 Jonathan Rosenoer, Safeguarding Your Critical Business Information, HARV. BUS. REV. (2002). 
92 Of course these protocols are not always followed.  It is widely known that Hillary Clinton, 
while she was Secretary of State, used a personal email system with an account kept on a 
server located at her personal residence in Chappaqua, New York, in violation of State 
Department protocols.  Michael S. Scmidt, Hilary Clinton Used Personal Email Account at 
State Dept., Possible Breaking Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2kcy22m. 
93 Susan Davis, Leading Edition E-newsletter for Purdue University Supervisors, PURDUE 
UNIVERSITY, http://www.purdue.edu/hr/LeadingEdition/LEdi_104_confidentiality.html 
(last visited Aug. 20, 2016). 
94 Switzer, 590 F. Supp. at 766. 
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about mergers and acquisitions to eschew cell phones and to limit their conver-
sations to land lines. Code names rather than the actual names of companies 
are routinely used in such deals.   
As such, the assumption reflected in Switzer and Judge Rakoff’s Salman 
opinion, that trading on the basis of an inadvertent tip is automatically legal, 
should be reexamined in light of the fact that such tips can be due to the 
negligence of the tipper, and the tippee who exploits the information may be well 
aware that the information is confidential and meant only for use for a valid 
corporate purpose. On the other hand, it is less clear that trading on the basis of 
an inadvertent tip can result in criminal as opposed to civil liability. This will 
depend on whether the inadvertent tip by an insider was sufficiently reckless 
such that the recklessness can satisfy the mens rea element of the relevant statute. 
 
2. Intentional Tipping in Cases in Which There Is No Personal 
Benefit to the Tipper 
 
Stunningly, even when someone tips another person intentionally, but 
does not receive a personal benefit, neither the tipper nor the tippee has violated 
Rule 10b-5’s prohibition on insider trading because there is no personal benefit 
to satisfy Dirks’ personal benefit test.95 In SEC v. Maxwell,96 David Maxwell, a 
senior executive at Worthington Foods, passed material, non-public information 
about Kellogg Co.'s impending purchase of Worthington Foods Inc. to Elton 
Jehn, his longtime barber, while receiving a haircut. Mr. Jehn bought Worthing-
ton stock and, though he had never purchased options previously in his life, he 
also bought 205 call options (purchasing some of these with a credit card). Mr. 
Jehn started buying Worthington stock and options on September 22, 1999, 
completing his purchases a week later on September 27th. On the morning of 
October 1, 1999, when Worthington and Kellogg issued a press release announ-
cing the deal, Worthington’s stock price rose by 61.4%, to $8.75. Mr. Jehn made 
a total of $192,000 in trading profits by selling after the announcement.97  
																																								 																				
95 The exception to the general rule permitting trading on the basis of intentional tips for which 
one received no personal benefit is SEC Rule 14e-3, passed in response to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Chiarella v. United States.  Rule 14e-3 prohibits insiders of either a bidding firm or a 
target firm from tipping confidential information about a tender offer.  This rule thereby prohibits 
“exactly the kind of tippee information the Supreme Court in Chiarella had found not to be a Rule 
10b-5 violation.” Fair to All People, supra note 7.  Rule 14e-3 also prohibits any person who 
possesses material information relating to a tender offer from trading in target company securities 
if the bidder has already taken substantial steps towards commencement of the bid.  Id.   
96 341 F. Supp. 2d 941 (S.D. Ohio 2004). 
97 Complaint, SEC v. Maxwell (S.D. Ohio 2003), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/com 
p17944_64.htm.  Mr. Jehn started buying Worthington stock on Sept. 22, 1999, the same day that 
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There seems to be no doubt that Mr. Maxwell violated a duty of trust 
and confidence to Worthington. As the SEC pointed out in its complaint, Mr. 
Maxwell “was well aware of Worthington's well-established policy and 
prohibitions against insider trading. He understood that he was prohibited from 
trading Worthington stock while in possession of material, non-public 
information and that he was prohibited from tipping others about that 
information.”98 In fact, when Dale Twomley, Worthingon’s CEO told Maxwell 
about the Company’s negotiations with Kellogg, “he explicitly instructed 
Maxwell to keep the information confidential.”99 And, as is typical in public 
companies, Worthington had an insider trading policy that prohibited 
employees from trading in Worthington's securities or tipping others while in 
possession of material, non-public information.100 According to the district 
court, Mr. Worthington was aware of this policy.101 
Rather slavishly following Dirks, and rejecting a litany of possible 
benefits that tipper-Maxwell could have received, the district court declined to 
find a personal benefit and, based on the lack of such a benefit, decided that 
the tipping did not violate the tipper’s fiduciary duties. Because the liability of 
tippees is “derivative” of tippers’ liability, Mr. Jehn also avoided liability.102  
It is true that Dirks stands for the proposition that trading on the basis of 
a tip that did not involve a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the tipper is 
legal. But in the insider trading context, the existence of fiduciary duties is 
coterminous with the existence of a relationship of trust and confidence. Mr. 
Maxwell clearly had such a duty. And he clearly breached this duty when he vio-
lated his obligation not to disclose the confidential and proprietary information 
entrusted to him by his company. In this context, imposing at least civil liability 
on Mr. Maxwell is consistent with the law. Imposing such liability also would 
be economically efficient, because such liability would be a low-cost mechanism 
for providing enhanced protections for companies’ property rights in infor-
mation, which is precisely what the insider trading laws are designed to do.103 
																																								 																				
he was tipped by Mr. Maxwell. Id. Mr. Jehn started buying call options a week later on Sept. 27, 
1999. Id. On Oct. 1, defendant Jehn liquidated his position in Worthington securities, selling 205 
call options. He sold ninety Oct. 15 calls for a profit of $64,774.50, sixty-five October 12 calls for 
a profit of $67,944.22, and fifty October 12 calls for a profit of $52,242.  Id.  He sold 1,500 shares 
of Worthington stock for a profit of $15,915.60, bringing his total realized profits to $191,954.57. 
98 Id. (“Maxwell breached his duty of trust and confidence to Worthington and its share-
holders by disclosing material non-public information to defendant Jehn.”). 
99 Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 944. 
100 Id. 
101 Id.   
 
103 Macey, supra note 18, at 60 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Chiarella v. 
United States is grounded in the theory that insider information is a form of intellectual 
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D. Tipping as Whistleblowing 
 
While the extant law of insider trading does not impose liability readily 
enough in cases in which tips occur by accident or mistake, current law imposes 
liability far too readily for tipping and trading in the whistleblowing context. 
On August 12, 2011, armed with authority conveyed on it in the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,104 the Securities and 
Exchange Commission finalized the rules for a new, significantly enhanced 
whistleblower program.105 Under the new whistleblower program, a whistle-
blower is anyone who voluntarily provides the SEC with “original information 
that leads to the successful enforcement by the SEC of a federal court or 
administrative action in which the SEC obtains monetary sanctions totaling 
more than $1 million.”106 Whistleblowers fill out an online form to become 
eligible for bounty, which can be substantial. Often whistleblowers are 
represented by counsel to make sure they successfully navigate the steps 
necessary to enable them to obtain a reward.  
The SEC clearly believes that financial incentives will motivate more 
insiders to come forward as whistleblowers when they have material non-
public information about fraud in companies subject to SEC regulation. And, 
of course, the SEC is right; financial incentives provide an additional (and 
sometimes the only) motivation for insiders to engage in whistleblowing.   
The use of financial incentives to motivate whistleblowing is starkly at 
odds with the Supreme Court’s policy, articulated in Dirks, of banning insider 
trading that is motivated by financial incentives. In fact, the entire purpose of 
Dirks’ personal benefit test is to distinguish between legally permissible insider 
trading, which is trading on the basis of tips of material non-public information 
that were not motivated by the receipt of any personal benefit, from illegal 
insider trading, which is trading on the basis of tips motivated not by a 
benevolent desire to ferret out fraud, but by some share in the trading profits or 
other pecuniary gain provided by the tippee/trader.   
The SEC’s bounty program for whistleblowers appears to be working. 
In May 2014, the SEC awarded over $30 million to an anonymous tipper who 
made a tip about a company whose identity remains unknown. “I was very 
concerned that investors were being cheated out of millions of dollars and that 
																																								 																				
property, and that the goal of SEC Rule 10b-5’s prohibition on insider trading is to protect 
property rights in information). 
104  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
105 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249. 
106 Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Establish Whistleblower Program (May 25, 
2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-116.htm. 
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the company was misleading them about its actions,” said the whistleblower in 
a press release issued by the law firm retained to represent him/her in obtaining 
the award.107 The law firm itself noted that its “client exposed extraordinarily 
deceitful and opportunistic practices that were deeply entrenched and well 
hidden,”108 also noting that “[f]ederal regulators never would have known 
about this fraud otherwise, and the scheme to cheat investors likely would have 
continued indefinitely.”109 
The SEC long had received tips from whistleblowers before enacting 
its bounty, but the SEC claims that the new bounties lead to higher quality 
information from whistleblowers.110 It is anomalous that the SEC encourages 
whistleblowing, while prosecuting tipping about ongoing frauds at public 
companies. As I have observed in previous work, there is little if any analytic 
or functional distinction between whistleblowing—especially when done for a 
bounty—and insider trading.111   
To the extent that there are differences between whistleblowing and 
insider trading, insider trading is, in several ways, superior to whistleblowing 
as a mechanism for revealing fraud and other sorts of illegality in public 
companies. Specifically, insider trading has three distinct advantages over 
whistleblowing as a means for ferreting out fraud. 
 First, unlike whistleblowing, those trading on the basis of material 
non-public information do not have to convince a bureaucrat at the SEC that 
their claims are worth pursuing.  Dirks himself was unable to interest the SEC 
about the scandal at Equity Funding. Raymond Dirks engaged in both trading 
and whistleblowing, but only the trading actually worked, as the SEC and 
business journalists at outlets such as the Wall Street Journal chose to ignore 
Dirks’ tipping. The history surrounding the fraud at Equity Funding, which was 
the subject of the SEC’s enforcement action against Raymond Dirks for insider 
trading in Dirks, reveals that whistleblowing was wholly unsuccessful in 
																																								 																				
107 Press Release, Phillips & Cohen LLP, Largest SEC Whistleblower Reward Goes to 
Phillips & Cohen Client—More than $30 Million (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.phillipsand 
cohen.com/2014/SEC-awards-Phillips-Cohen-whistleblower-client-30-million-to-35-millio 
n-largest-reward-yet.shtml.  
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Press Release, SEC, supra note 91 (quoting SEC Chairman Mary L Schapiro, who 
asserted that “[w]hile the SEC has a history of receiving a high volume of tips and 
complaints, the quality of the tips we have received has been better since Dodd-Frank became 
law.  We expect this trend to continue, and these final rules map out simplified and 
transparent procedures for whistleblowers to provide us critical information.”). 
111 See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical 
Analysis of Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899 (2007).   
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ferreting out the fraud at Equity Funding. Mr. Dirks attempted to tip not only 
the SEC, but also state insurance commissioners, as well as Equity Funding’s 
outside auditors.112 
Whistleblowing directed at exposing the fraud at Equity Funding began 
in 1971, but the fraud at Equity Funding was not revealed until 1973, when 
Dirks began trading. The CEO of Equity Funding and one of the main culprits 
of the fraud testified that before the insider trading prompted by Secrist’s 
tipping he had “received no questions from auditors, state regulatory author-
ities, or federal regulatory authorities that suggested that ‘they suspected there 
was a fraud at Equity Funding.’” 113 
Of course the Equity Funding scandal is only one in a long list of frauds 
that the SEC and other financial regulators failed to uncover. Perhaps the most 
well-known example of the SEC ignoring a credible tip from a whistleblower is 
Harry Markopolos’s efforts to alert the SEC to the massive securities fraud being 
perpetrated by Bernie Madoff at his investment firm, Bernard L. Madoff 
Investment Securities. “[M]y team and I tried our best to get the Securities and 
Exchange Commission [SEC] to investigate and shut down the Madoff Ponzi 
scheme with repeated and credible warnings,” Markopolos said during his 
testimony before the Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets.114 
He said he submitted an eight-page document listing red flags and mathematical 
proof of a major fraud to the SEC’s Boston Regional Office in May of 2000. Mr. 
Markopolos resubmitted his evidence to SEC offices in 2001, 2005, 2007, and 
2008, without attracting the attention of the regulators.115 It was not until the 
financial markets crashed in 2008 and liquidity-strapped investors attempted to 
cash-in their investments in large numbers that the fraud was revealed, when  
the business simply collapsed as the number of new “investors” sharply declined 
and current clients began clamoring for their money in large numbers. Mad- 
off’s fraud caused losses of approximately $17 billion116 among his firm’s 4,800 
																																								 																				
112 See id. at 1917-19 (discussing the various attempts to engage in whistleblowing 
concerning the fraud at Equity Funding). 
113 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, Dirks v. SEC, 463 
U.S. 646 (1983) (No. 82-276). 
114 Assessing the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enter. of the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 
111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Harry Markopolos, CFA, CFE, Chartered Financial 
Analyst and Certified Fraud Examiner).  
115 Dick Carozza, Chasing Madoff:  An Interview with Harry Markopolos, FRAUD MAGAZINE 
(2009), http://www.fraud-magazine.com/article.aspx?id=313. 
116 Jordan Maglich, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Five Years Later, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2013), https:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/jordanmaglich/2013/12/09/madoff-ponzi-scheme-five-years-later/.  
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clients,117 including the author and Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel, Yeshiva 
University, Tel Aviv’s Technion University, the North Shore-Long Island 
Jewish Health System pension fund, and the Korea Teachers Pension fund.118   
While the Madoff fraud reveals one significant advantage of insider 
trading over whistleblowing as a vehicle for exposing fraud, it also reveals that 
insider trading has a structural defect as a mechanism for revealing fraud. 
Specifically, while insider trading has the virtue of revealing fraud that 
government officials choose to ignore, insider trading can only occur in 
companies with shares that trade on public stock markets. Thus, insider trading 
was not available as a means to reveal the fraud at Bernard L. Madoff 
Investment Securities because the company was privately held and there was 
no public market on which its stock could be shorted or for which derivative 
securities such as put options could be created. 
A second advantage of insider trading over whistleblowing is the 
elimination of false positives. Government agencies, media outlets and others 
who receive tips from whistleblowers must verify those tips because there is 
no assurance that the information provided by whistleblowers will be accurate. 
Whistleblowers may be mistaken, or they may be purposefully inaccurate, as 
when they engage in whistleblowing for motives such as revenge or bounty. It 
is of course true that those engaging in insider trading on the basis of 
knowledge of hidden fraud also are likely to have all sorts of selfish motives. 
But unlike with whistleblowing, with insider trading there is a cost to providing 
erroneous information. It is costly to those trading on the basis of material non-
public information about an ongoing fraud to be mistaken because, when one 
trades, one loses money on one’s mistakes. 
A third advantage of insider trading over whistleblowing is that while 
there is no guarantee that there will be any follow-up to a whistleblower’s tip, 
if the inside information on which a trader bases her trading is not revealed, 
then the share price of the company to which the information pertains will not 
change and neither the insider nor her tippee will make trading profits. 
Profiting from material non-public information about a fraud in a company 
requires that an insider sell shares short (or purchase derivative securities such 
as put options or swaps whose value increases when the value of the underlying 
assets declines) and then cover the short position at some point in the future 
																																								 																				
117 Robert Frank, Amir Efrati, Aaron Lucchetti, & Chad Bray, Madoff Jailed After Admitting 
Epic Scam, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2009. 
118 Madoff’s Victims, WALL ST. J., http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/st_madoff 
_victims_20081215.html (last updated Mar. 6, 2009); see also Exhibit A, “Client List,” http:// 
online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/madoffclientlist020409.pdf (document listing 
all of Madoff’s clients); Harold A. Pollack, Why Were So Many Madoff Victims Jewish?, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/02/madoff-jew 
ish-affinity-fraud/460446/.   
Vol. 2:1]          Beyond the Personal Benefit Test    
 
 
59 
when the company’s share price declines. In the context of fraud, the insider’s 
profit-making opportunity does not arise unless and until the fraud at the 
company is revealed. Unless the fraud is revealed somehow, such as by the 
announcement of an investigation or litigation by a regulatory agency, or in a 
news report, the company’s share price may remain stable or even increase in 
value, leaving the trader with a costly position to unwind. 
All seem to agree that whistleblowing, even for entirely venal reasons 
such as revenge, should be encouraged and rewarded. But insider trading, even 
to reveal a massive fraud in a public company, cannot be done for profit, but 
only for altruistic reasons. Even in situations, like Madoff and Dirks¸ in which 
insiders tried and failed to inform regulators of corporate fraud, insider trading 
to reveal such fraud is impermissible if the tipper seeks a “bounty” in the form 
of a personal benefit in exchange for the information. 
One response to the argument that insider trading based on fraud is 
equivalent to whistleblowing is that, in the insider trading context, the trading 
comes at the expense of investors, while in whistleblowing, the remuneration 
for the information reduces the recovery for all shareholders and therefore is 
more fairly distributed. There are two answers to this objection to insider 
trading about fraud on fairness grounds. First, any unfairness associated with 
insider trading that reveals fraud is merely a problem of allocating the gains 
and losses of an unambiguously socially desirable outcome: the revelation of 
fraud. While it may be more desirable for fraud to be revealed by whistle-
blowing than by tipping by insiders followed by trading by tippees, history in 
the form of the Madoff and Equity Funding scandals shows that fraud will go 
undetected if we rely solely on whistleblowers. As such, insider trading to 
reveal fraud as occurred in Dirks may, as the Supreme Court indicated, be the 
only way to uncover some instances of fraud.   
Second, from the perspective of the counterparty who trades with 
someone with material non-public information, there is no difference between 
Dirks-style insider trading, which is done for free, and insider trading that is 
done for some kind of pecuniary benefit. The counterparty’s losses are the 
same, and therefore, the permissible trading in Dirks is not distinguishable 
from a fairness point of view from trading based on the same underlying 
information about fraud that is motivated by a financial incentive. 
Finally, there is reason to believe that those who trade with tippees may 
be in a better position to bear the losses associated with such trading than other 
investors. Research on insider trading reveals an important distinction between 
“price function” traders who are motivated to trade by perceived arbitrage 
opportunities presented by price distortions and “time function” traders, whose 
trading is not based on an informed view of the value of securities relative to 
their prices, but on external factors, particularly changing demands for savings 
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and liquidity over the course of a family’s life cycle.119 Price-function traders 
are the arbitragers, floor traders, investment bankers, and hedge funds who 
invest in finding value. When an insider sells on the basis of a tip, the temporary 
decline in the price of the stock sold will be perceived by these price function 
traders as an arbitrage opportunity, because the low price makes the stock look 
like a bargain based on these price-function traders’ models. In contrast, the 
insider trading will have no effect on time function traders whose trading is not 
motivated by price. In contrast to price function traders, who are professionals 
(or day traders who think that they are professionals), time function traders are 
not motivated by short-term fluctuations in securities prices, so insider trading 
will not deleteriously affect them. This point is particularly strong in light of 
the fact that, unlike price function traders, rational time function traders will 
hold diversified portfolios of securities that make them immune to the effects 
of insider trading because, statistically speaking, they will be trading alongside 
insiders as often as they will be trading against insiders.120 
 
E. Beyond Fraud: Tipping for the Good of the Company 
 
As the Courts in both Dirks and Newman recognized, insider trading 
can be consistent with a tipper’s fiduciary duties. When tipping is done to 
further a legitimate corporate purpose, it is permissible. In addition to revealing 
corporate fraud, valid corporate purposes include correcting misinformation 
about securities pricing and attracting a more attentive and extensive range of 
coverage by financial analysts. Thus, while it is illegitimate to exploit material 
non-public information for personal gain, it is legitimate to pass along the same 
information to others who profit from it, as long as the motive does not involve 
a personal benefit.   
Under current law, a corporate insider can provide a tip to a trader at a 
hedge fund, and as long as the insider does not receive a personal benefit, the 
insider is not legally responsible for providing the tip, regardless of the harm 
the tip causes to the corporation. This strange result is due to the fact that under 
the personal benefit test established by the Dirks Court, the test of whether an 
insider’s tip is in breach of a fiduciary duty is not whether the tip furthers the 
corporation’s interests, but whether the insider refers a personal benefit from 
providing the tip.   
Corporations should have the right to determine when their employees 
and agents trade on the basis of the proprietary information they receive in the 
course of their official duties, but the personal benefit test effectively deprives 
																																								 																				
119 Haddock & Macey, supra note 26. 
120 Kenneth Scott, Insider Trading:  Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 801 (1980). 
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them of this in two ways. First, the personal benefit test does not require a tipper 
to obtain the consent of her company—or even to provide notice to the com-
pany—prior to tipping, even in cases in which it clearly is in the best interests of 
the corporation and its shareholders to keep such information confidential, as in 
the case of an impending tender offer for the shares of another company. Regard-
less of the content of the information, as long as the tipper does not receive a 
personal benefit from her tip, the tipping and subsequent trading are legal. 
Second, and perhaps even more bizarrely, according to a separate line 
of Supreme Court reasoning developed in O’Hagan, where a corporate insider 
directly engages in trading on the basis of material non-public information, 
such trading does not violate the securities laws as long as the trading insider 
notifies the company of her intention to trade.121 In O’Hagan, in the course of 
deciding that James O’Hagan was criminally liable for trading on the basis of 
material non-public information about an impending tender offer for the 
outstanding shares of Pillsbury, the Court indicates that Mr. O’Hagan could 
have avoided liability entirely if he had simply notified Grand Met, the bidder, 
and Dorsey & Whitney, his law firm, of his intention to trade. The Court’s 
reasoning is that Mr. O’Hagan’s duty was not to maintain the confidentiality 
of the information entrusted to him, but instead either to abstain from trading 
or to disclose his intention to trade to the source of the information.122 
The rather tortured logic that brings the Court to this odd result is 
described in one of the more interesting footnotes in the annals of securities 
regulation. This footnote, number 9 of the opinion, begins with the premise that 
the element of fraud required to establish a violation of Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act requires a showing of deception, and that the 
“requirement of deception precludes § 10(b) liability when a person trading on 
the basis of non-public information has disclosed his trading plans to, or 
obtained authorization from, the principal.”123   
Footnote 9 justifies its finding that an insider is entitled to a “get out of 
jail free card” if she discloses her intention to trade before actually trading by 
indicating that as soon as a disloyal agent discloses his imminent intention to 
trade, her principal “may seek appropriate equitable relief under state law.”124 
The “appropriate equitable relief” to which the Supreme Court refers in 
footnote 9 is injunctive relief. After being notified by an insider trader of her 
intent to trade, a corporation or law firm or other guardian of the confidentiality 
of the information on which the insider wishes to trade can go to court and seek 
an injunction barring the insider from trading.   
																																								 																				
121 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
122 Id. at 654-55, 655 n.6. 
123 Id. at 654-55, 659 n.9. 
124 Id. 
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The “appropriate equitable relief” may not be sufficient relief for two 
reasons. First, there is no requirement that the insider delay her trading after 
disclosing her intention to trade until after the corporation has had an 
opportunity to obtain an injunction. It is likely that in most cases an insider will 
be able to disclose and trade before injunctive relief can be obtained. Second, 
a corporation may be reluctant to seek equitable relief for fear of not being able 
to maintain the confidentiality of the information in the hearing on the 
injunction. While it may be possible to conduct the hearing in complete 
confidence, there is no assurance that confidentiality can be successfully 
maintained. Any third party observing the court proceeding or even learning 
about it would be free to trade as long as she lacked a preexisting relationship 
of trust and confidence with the source of the information. Moreover, 
establishing the irreparable harm necessary to obtain an injunction would 
require revealing the nature of the information, thereby thwarting the whole 
object of the exercise: keeping the information from becoming reflected in the 
share price of the company to which it pertains. 
The point here is not that disclosure by insiders of material non-public 
information should be categorically banned, as the SEC would like. Rather the 
point is that, having determined that it is permissible for a corporation through 
its agents to disclose material non-public information to traders when doing so 
serves a legitimate corporate purpose, it is necessary to determine: (a) what 
constitutes a legitimate corporate purpose that permits such disclosure and 
trading, and (b) how the use of material non-public information should be 
controlled as a matter of internal corporate governance of companies whose 
shares are publicly traded.  
The Supreme Court invented the personal benefit test in Dirks as the 
tool to be used to make these determinations. If a tip of material non-public 
information is done for no personal benefit, then, in the Court’s view, the tip: 
(a) serves a legitimate corporate purpose (i.e. the tip is consistent with the 
tipper’s fiduciary duties); and (b) the tipper gets to control the use of the 
material non-public information, and is free to use the information to tip 
professional traders, thereby enabling them to profit from the information. 
The Court is correct that it should be permissible for a corporation 
through its agents to disclose material non-public information to traders when 
doing so serves a legitimate corporate purpose. But the personal benefit test is 
a strange tool for determining what tipping and trading is legitimate and what 
is not. Similarly, the “disclose or abstain” rule as articulated in O’Hagan is an 
odd mechanism for controlling the disclosure of material non-public infor-
mation. Insiders in possession of material non-public information should not 
be able to legitimize their use of such information by disclosing their trading 
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intentions before trading. Corporations with legitimate material non-public 
information that they wish to keep confidential should not have to seek an 
injunction to protect such information. 
The personal benefit test should be replaced by a rule that allows 
corporations to control the use of the information they have created. The issue 
of whether it is permissible to tip material non-public information should 
depend simply on whether such tipping is or is not consistent with the tippers’ 
fiduciary duties. While the receipt of a personal benefit may occasionally 
provide some insight into the fiduciary duty analysis, the personal benefit test 
should no longer be dispositive. For example, where the information in 
question concerns a major fraud at a company, then there is no breach of 
fiduciary duty for disclosing such information, regardless of whether the tipper 
receives a pecuniary benefit from such disclosure.125 
Further, where the person who engages in the tip is acting within the 
scope of their employment and within areas of their discretion, tipping should 
be permitted. Thus for example, where the Chief Financial Officer of a 
corporation tips analysts in order to promote analyst coverage or when a 
corporate communications officer briefs analysts in order to correct some 
misunderstanding about a company’s operations or financial reporting, such 
tipping should be presumptively permissible. 
 
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PERSONAL BENEFIT TEST AND  
HOW TO IMPROVE IT 
 
The analysis in this Article can be summarized in the following chart, 
which also depicts the differences between the approach to tipping and trading 
presented here and the contrasting approaches of the Court and the SEC: 
 
TIPPEE LIABILITY 
Tipping Correlated 
or Caused by: 
Tippee Liability? 
SEC / DOJ Federal Courts Efficiency 
Pecuniary / Non-
Pecuniary Benefit to 
Tipper 
Yes Yes 
Yes  
(unless tip involves 
corporate fraud) 
																																								 																				
125 The receipt of a personal benefit might have relevance even in the case of tipping about 
an ongoing corporate fraud.  For example, the amount of the personal benefit should be 
deducted from any whistleblower bounty the tipper may be entitled to receive. 
 
                                  Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [June 2017 
 
 
64 
Familial 
Relationship – 
Intentional126 
Yes Yes Yes 
Tip to Unrelated 
Party – No Personal 
Benefit to Tipper 
No127 No Yes 
Mistake / Negligent 
–Tip to Family 
Member128 
Yes Yes Yes 
Mistake / Negligent 
–Tip to Analyst129 Yes No Yes 
Mistake / Negligent 
–Tip to Stranger130 Yes No Yes 
Legitimate Business 
Purpose for Tip131 Yes 
No  
(unless 
personal) 
No  
(even if personal) 
 
 As the chart indicates, the differences indicated by the current approach 
arise in three contexts. First, the efficiency approach advocated here would lead 
to a less strict application of insider trading laws in situations in which tipping 
																																								 																				
126 United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
127 While there is no liability in general for intentional tipping and trading where the tipper 
receives no personal benefit and has no familial or close personal relationship with the tippee, 
the executive branch and the federal courts do impose liability if the insider trading is done 
in connection with a tender offer, under special authority granted to the SEC pursuant to 
Section 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 USC. §§ 78(a)-(lll) (1976).  SEC Rule 14e-3 imposes 
a duty to disclose (or abstain from trading on) material non-public information on any person 
in possession of such information, regardless of whether that person is an insider or in a 
position of trust and confidence with the source of the information.  45 Fed. Reg. 60,410-60, 
413 (1980) (Rule 14e-3 is applicable to “any person” irrespective of their relationship to the 
source of the information).  
128 Michael S. Schacter, The Accidental Tipper:  Personal Benefit Requirement for Insider 
Trading, 244 N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Public 
ations/2010/09/The%20Accidental%20Tipper%20Personal%20Benefit%20Requireme__/ 
Files/TheAccidentalTipperpdf/FileAttachment/The-Accidental-Tipper.pdf.  
129 Here I am assuming that the tippee was aware that the tip was negligently or mistakenly 
made by the tipper and the tippee traded on it anyway.  See Salman, 792 F.3d 1087.  
130 SEC v. Sabrdaran, Case No. 14-CV-04825-JSC, 2015 WL 901352 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 
2015); SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941 (S.D. Ohio 2004); SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 
756 (W.D. Okla. 1984). 
131 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
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or trading on the basis of inside information about corporate fraud. Currently, 
such trading is illegal if the tipper receives any sort of personal benefit from 
the tipping. Efficiency, which strongly favors ferreting out fraud, would 
condone trading or tipping by those in possession of inside information about 
a fraud even if they personally benefit by such trading or tipping.   
Second, the efficiency approach advocated here leads to a stricter 
application of insider trading laws in situations in which insider information is 
disclosed by a tipper negligently, whether by accident or mistake. The approach 
advocated here also will result in the application of Rule 10b-5’s prohibitions 
on tipping and trading when done intentionally but without any personal benefit 
inuring to the tipper. Such trading currently does not violate the law because the 
personal benefit test forecloses liability in situations in which the tipper receives 
no personal benefit. In contrast, the efficiency approach advocated here would 
impose liability on tippers who negligently reveal material non-public infor-
mation because of the fiduciary duty of care owed by insiders by virtue of their 
relationship of trust and confidence with the company, and the strong economic 
rationale for maintaining the confidentiality of legitimate, non-public infor-
mation whose value to its creator will be destroyed if it is revealed before it can 
be acted upon. 
Finally, unlike current approaches, the efficiency approach advocated 
here would not impose liability on those who disclose material non-public 
information for a legitimate corporate purpose, even if they receive a personal 
benefit for such disclosure. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In adopting the personal benefit test, the Court in Dirks essentially drew 
a statistical inference about the correlation between the receipt of a personal 
benefit by a tipper and the breach of fiduciary duty by the tipper. The personal 
benefit test indicates that tipping for a personal benefit is perfectly correlated 
with behavior that reflects the breach of one’s fiduciary duties, while tipping 
without receiving a personal benefit is perfectly correlated with behavior that 
is consistent with one’s fiduciary duties.   
One implication of the analysis in this Article is that the correlation 
between the receipt of a personal benefit and the breach of fiduciary duties is 
far from perfect. A tipper who receives no personal benefit can nonetheless 
harm the company that has entrusted her with material non-public information. 
After all, if a tipper informs a perfect stranger of an impending tender offer for 
another company that her company is on the verge of announcing without 
receiving any attendant personal benefit, then under the personal benefit test 
the insider would not have breached any fiduciary duty. On the other hand, if 
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an insider passes along a tip about an ongoing fraud and does receive a personal 
benefit, then such tipping is a crime, notwithstanding the fact that there is no 
fiduciary duty to maintain the confidentiality of an ongoing fraud and 
notwithstanding the significant social benefits associated with uncovering 
corporate fraud. 
Current insider trading doctrine as reflected in the personal benefit test 
is too lenient on insider trading in certain circumstances (i.e. where negligent 
behavior leads to a tip by mistake) and too strict in other circumstances (i.e. 
where the tip alerts the tippee to fraud). This Article sets the stage for a more 
nuanced approach to insder trading law, one in which a personal benefit is 
considered a possible symptom of punishable insider trading, instead of a 
certain diagnosis. 
The personal test, notwithstanding the flaws elucidated in this Article, 
was a major advance in the application of economic theory to legal doctrine. 
Specifically, the personal benefit test advances the theory enunciated in 
Chiarella that material non-public information about a company is a valuable 
asset in the form of intellectual property, and that, as such, the fundamental 
purpose of insider trading law is to protect property rights in information.    
Dirks is noteworthy for its recognition of the fact that protecting 
property rights in information requires rules that do more than simply prohibit 
the use of material non-public information by the “wrong people,” i.e. those 
who have abused their positions of trust and confidence to purloin the 
information from the company that created it. In addition to prohibiting the 
wrong people from using material insider information, the law should enable 
the “right people,” i.e. those who created the material non-public information 
to profit from their discovery and development of such information.   
The contribution of the personal benefit test developed in Dirks is that 
it acknowledges not only the need to prohibit some trading on the basis of 
material non-public information, but also the desirability, from a social welfare 
perspective, of encouraging other trading motivated by such information. The 
personal benefit test is based on the premise that those who reveal (tip) material 
non-public information and the tippees who trade on that information, should 
be punished if and only if their tips were motivated by venality in that they 
were provided in exchange for a personal benefit. Those who tip such 
information without receiving a personal benefit, together with their tippees, 
should be permitted to trade under the personal benefit test because the test 
specifies that only trading in which the tipper receives a personal benefit from 
the tipper is illegal.  
While the test often works well, as it did in Newman, it is far from 
perfect. Socially undesirable trading such as that done by professional traders 
on the basis of information that was mistakenly or accidentally revealed should 
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be banned and those who negligently disclose such information should be 
punished, at least civilly. Socially desirable trading, such as that done to reveal 
an ongoing corporate fraud should be permitted, even where the person who 
tips this information receives a personal benefit. Tippers should be allowed to 
profit from revealing corporate fraud and other corporate malfeasance just as 
whistleblowers are encouraged to seek bounties from the government in 
exchange for their tipping. 
The argument in favor of allowing tippers to profit from their tips by 
trading is particularly strong in light of the evidence from events such as the 
Madoff Ponzi scheme and the Equity Funding fraud described in this Article 
indicating that whistleblowers often are ignored by regulators. Without the 
ability to tip in exchange for a personal benefit, frauds can go undetected for 
decades. 
